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Gene drive systems promote the spread of genetic elements through 
populations by assuring they are inherited more often than Mendelian 
segregation would predict(see the figure). Natural examples of gene drive 
from Drosophila include sex-ratio meiotic drive, segregation distortion, and 
replicative transposition. Synthetic drive systems based on selective 
embryonic lethality or homing endonucleases have been described previously 
in Drosophila melanogaster (1–3), but they are difficult to build or are limited 
to transgenic populations. In contrast, RNA-guided gene drives based on the 
CRISPR/Cas9 nuclease can, in principle, be constructed by any laboratory 
capable of making transgenic organisms (4). They have tremendous potential 
to address global problems in health, agriculture, and conservation, but their 
capacity to alter wild populations outside the laboratory demands caution (4-
7).Just as researchers working with self-propagating pathogens must ensure 
that these agents do not escape to the outside world, scientists working in the 
laboratory with gene drive constructs are responsible for keeping them 
confined (4,6,7). 
 
Two of us recently used a CRISPR/Cas9-based gene drive system to 
generate a Drosophila strain homozygous for a loss-of-function mutation [the 
mutagenic chain reaction (6)](see the figure). Even though D. melanogaster 
ordinarily poses no threat to human health or agriculture, the accidental 
release of flies carrying gene drive constructs from the laboratory could have 
unpredictable ecological consequences. This study therefore used 
institutionally approved stringent barrier methods. Only one experimenter 
handled the flies, inside an Arthropod Containment Level 2 insectary suitable 
for work with mosquitoes carrying human pathogens. Because barrier 
protocols can be vulnerable to human error (8), these authors suggested (6) 
that additional molecular confinement methods described (4) and used by 
others of us in budding yeast (9) could further reduce risks. That these studies 
documented highly efficient RNA- guided gene drive in flies and yeast 
underscores the potential of the technology and the risk resulting from an 
accidental release. 
 
As concerned scientists working in related areas, we engaged in collective 
discussions to identify and publicize interim safety recommendations for 
laboratory research involving potential gene drive systems while formal 
national guidelines are developed. Although we cannot claim to represent all 
researchers, we share a commitment to the safe and responsible 
development of gene drive technology. Although we differ in our assessments 
of the types of precaution needed, we recognize that any single confinement 
strategy could fail. We therefore unanimously recommend that future studies 
usea combination of stringent confinement strategies (see the table) 
whenever possible and always use safeguards adequate for preventing the 
unintentional release of synthetic gene drive systems into natural populations. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS.RNA-guided gene drive systems are created by 
delivering into the germline a DNA cassette encoding Cas9 and a single 
synthetic guide RNA (sgRNA) that is flanked by sequences matching those on 
either side of the sgRNA target site (4). Cas9 nuclease-stimulated copying of 
the cassette into the target allele leads to continued Cas9+sgRNA expression 
and subsequent copying of the cassette into the other allele (6,9). The 
recurrent conversion of heterozygotes into homozygotes permits spread 
through populations (see the figure 1). 
 
The vast majority of recent genome engineering approaches developed in 
model organisms neither involve nor risk the creation of gene drive systems. 
For example, Drosophila mutants can be readily generated by injecting 
sgRNAs or sgRNA-encoding plasmids into transgenic embryos expressing 
Cas9 (10–13) or by crossing sgRNA-expressing strains to Cas9-expressing 
strains (12–14).These approaches do not risk creating a gene drive system 
because cassettes encoding Cas9 and sgRNA are not inserted into the cut 
site or located adjacent to one another in the genome and can thus be safely 
used by researchers without additional precautions. Given the availability of 
efficient alternatives and the potential risks, we recommend that gene drive 
approaches to genome engineering be strictly reserved for cases that require 
their use.  
 
The safest approach for using gene drives creates biallelic mutations with an 
sgRNA-only cassette that can spread only when combined with an unlinked 
Cas9 transgene (4). In such a “split gene drive system,” homozygous 
individuals lacking the Cas9 gene can be easily isolated in subsequent 
generations. The efficiency of gene drive exhibited by a split system in yeast 
is equivalent to that of a construct encoding both Cas9 and sgRNA (9). Split 
drive systems present a much lower risk if organisms are accidentally 
released because the population frequency of the Cas9 gene will be 
determined by normal, non drive dynamics, consequently limiting the spread 
of the sgRNA cassette. 
 
Nevertheless, any mutational event that moves the Cas9 gene into or directly 
adjacent to the sgRNA cassette could create an autonomous Cas9+sgRNA 
drive system by allowing the Cas9 gene to be copied into the target locus 
along with the sgRNA cassette upon repair of Cas9-induced DNA cleavage. 
Although the probability of such an event is extremely low, we recommend 
that at least one additional form of stringent confinement be used (see table 1) 
and that the strains be continually monitored.  
 
Other forms of stringent confinement include performing experiments in an 
area lacking wild populations (4) and, when the goal is to study gene drive 
systems in the laboratory, exclusively targeting synthetic sequences not found 
in natural populations (3,4,9). Because these strategies suffer from 
independent vulnerabilities, the safety improvements afforded by combining 
them will be multiplicative. Thus, the great majority of gene drive experiments 
can be performed with minimal risk of altering wild populations. Accordingly, 
we strongly recommend that: 
 
1) All work involving potential gene drive systems should be preceded by a 
thorough assessment by the relevant biosafety authorities of the risk of 
unwanted release from the laboratory. We encourage these authorities to 
seek guidance from external experts and make their evaluation available to 
others. 
2) All laboratory gene drive experiments should employ at least two stringent 
confinement strategies (see the table) whenever possible to minimize the risk 
of altering wild populations. Using one form of confinement may be justified 
only if relevant biosafety authorities determine that it will reduce the probability 
of release to a level that is acceptably low. This probability must be defined on 
a case-by-case basis. The analyses necessary to confidently predict the 
efficacy of confinement strategies for gene drive systems are in a nascent 
form. Therefore, any proposal to use one rather than multiple forms of 
confinement requires even greater scrutiny and extensive deliberation 
between regulatory authorities and scientists. 
 
3) Organisms carrying gene drive constructs that could spread if the 
reproductively capable life stages were to escape in transit should not be 
distributed to other institutions until formal biosafety guidelines are established. 
Whenever possible, laboratories should instead send DNA constructs or 
information sufficient to reconstruct the gene drive. Protocols for distributing 
materials should be established in discussion with the wider research 
community and other relevant stakeholders. 
 
Broadly inclusive and ongoing discussions among diverse groups concerning 
safeguards, transparency, proper use, and public involvement should inform 
expert bodies as they develop formal research guidelines for gene drive 
research in the laboratory and potential transitions to open field trials. We 
applaud the U.S. National Academy of Sciences for committing to provide 
recommendations for responsible gene drive research (15). By recommending 
strong safeguards and encouraging discussion of this technology, we hope to 
build a foundation of public trust for potential future applications in public 
health, sustainable agriculture, and ecological conservation. 
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Figure 1: The spread of RNA-guided gene drive systems. Unlike the population 
dynamics of normal genomic alterations, gene drive systems can spread changes 
through wild populations by converting heterozygotes into homozygotes in each 
generation.  
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